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Introduction
Combined intervention consisting of
military, economic and diplomatic forms
tend to be relatively effective strategy in
shortening the expected duration of a
conflict if it was framed at managing
conflict and executed under specific
sequence. As such, the sequence under
which diplomacy (mediation) takes
precedence over two other forms of
economic and military has a high probability
to decrease the expected duration of a
conflict (Regan and Aydin,2004). The
results of their study suggest that diplomacy
and mediation are a critical component in
determining the effect of outside
interventions and they are effective tools of
conflict management. Further, it suggests
that the performance of economic
intervention is conditioned by their
combination with diplomacy and the
sequence under which they are carried out.
The fifth peace process in Sri Lanka which
came into effect in 2002 February is a case
which while sharesaspects and characteristics
identical to the specification described by the
above empirical study in terms of forms and
sequence of intervention strategies it offers
an excellent opportunity to test potential effect
of combined interv ention by using qualitative
methods of analysis that most of the empirical
studies lack in their analysis, and thus they
fail to capture complete picture of factors and
conditions affecting expected outcome of
intervention attempt.
In this sense, two different but interrelated
questions are addressed in this paper.0First,
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Abstract
Over the recent past, there has been an increasing importance of managing civil conflicts
with the involvement of international actors such as individual states, regional and international
multilateral organizations (Regan 2002).In Sri Lanka, unprecedently, there had been a close
international involvement in the peace process right from its onset in 2002 with the proclaimed
attempt of finding political solution to the decades-long civil war between government of Sri
Lanka(GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam(LTTE). In this backdrop, this paper
attempts to examine systematically the potential effects of Norway-led multilateral intervention
on the course and duration of the civil war in Sri Lanka by using qualitative analysis based
on major empirical argumentation of the scholarship of effects of external intervention in
civil war situation. Results of the analysis suggest dichotomous findings that while supporting
the empirical argument casts skepticism over the adequate treatment of factors that influence
the outcome of intervention by the empirical studies.
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what were the potential outcomes of the
multilateral intervention in Sri Lanka,
second what were the factors or conditions
that affect intended outcome of the
intervention in Sri Lanka. Two circum
stances necessitate to raising these questions
for systematic answer. First one stems out
of methodological inadequacy of the
empirical studies (quantitative methods)
which either tends to overlook or is
inadequate to address the effect of other
unobserved factors (way of administration
of strategies and subjective factors such as
resolve and identity of the protagonists).
Second one is associated with the opinion
and expectation of policy community that
intervention tends to shorten the duration
of conflict, it is a view that runs in contrast
to the empirical findings of intervention
itself increases the expected duration of civil
war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000: Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline, 2000: Regan, 2002.
2003: Fearon and Laitin, 2003).Thus, this
paper intends to address these two issues
by answering those two questions in a more
systematic manner in which qualitative
methods (descriptive analysis) possibly
replicate empirical argumentation and
interpretation. For this purpose the
following assumption is explored. That
diplomacy centered combined intervention
is effective in decreasing the expected
duration of the civil war in Sri Lanka, and
its level of effectiveness is conditioned to
both role and effect of other two
supplementary forms( economic and
military) of intervention and their
administration.
Review of Literature
Past studies on the Fifth peace process of
Sri Lanka demonstrate that there existed a
combined or multilateral intervention
composed of diplomatic, economic and
military forms of strategies with the
sequence in which Norway’s mediatory
roles and functioning, preceded two other
supplementary components of military and
economic interventions by the US, EU and
Japan respectively in a reasonable time period
(by four years).However, the past studies
suggest a mix of far-reaching effects resulted
from the intervention throughout the three
year period of time beginning from 2002 to
2005 (Noyahr,2006: Suryanarayan,2006:
Saravanamuthu,2006). Accordingly, it is
widely agreed by the past studies that
combined intervention had significantly
influenced the duration of the conflict to the
extent in which protracted cessation of
hostilities and the resultant peace process was
put in place (Athas,2006: Venkataramanan,
2006: Uyangoda, 2005a).
Methodology
As for the methodology, a descriptive
analytical framework based on major
argumentation and interpretation of empirical
literature of external intervention and civil war
duration is adopted. Accordingly, the major
goal of all intervention attempts is the
cessation of hostilities, regardless of the
factors that motivated the intervention
(Regan,1996),and if there was a cessation of
hostilities between the combatants for a period
of more than six moths after an intervention
occurred can be regarded as successful
intervention attempt at shortening the
expected duration of a conflict(Regan,
2000).More over, all interventions attempts
are presumably targeted at some sort of
conflict management (Regan 2002).
Defining Multilateral Intervention
A definition of multilateral intervention is in
order. The usual type of cases such as where
multiple states intervene on behalf of one side
in an intrastate conflict with the goal of
bolstering the capabilities of their client or
UN authorized or sanctioned intervention do
not fall under the rubric of what I call here
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multilateral intervention in the Sri Lankan
context and in this paper as well. By
multilateral intervention I refer to the
intervention by a group of states (Norway,
USA, EU and Japan) that played collective
and individual roles under the lead of
Norway’s mediation (diplomatic
intervention),  and their intervention
entailed the active placement of personal
and resource on the ground in Sri Lanka.
More over, the phrase ‘combined interven
tion’ is used in exchange of multilateral
intervention on parallel basis here in order
to avoid possible confusion and to facilitate
analysis followed by interpretation of the
results.
Norway’s facilitation and
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)
The presence of Norway as a third-party
facilitator in the Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict
resolution falls as back as 1998(Helegesen
2003:Samaranayeke2006:Silva 2002).
Norway had offered its services to bring the
two parties together much earlier. These
early efforts gathered momentum towards
the end of 2001 when Ranil Wickreme
singhe, who belonged to the opposition
United National Party, became Prime
Minister of Sri Lanka (Uyangoda, 2005a;
Poncalan,2005).The unilateral ceasefire
declared by the LTTE which followed by
similar gesture by the new Government of
Sri Lanka  (GoSL) and their (both GoSL
and LTTE) offer to the Norwegian
emissaries that they were prepared for a just
and honorable settlement paved way for the
Norway facilitated negotiation process to
begin with in 2002 February 22 with the
signing of Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) followed by Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA) between the GoSL and the LTTE
(Samaranayeke, 2006: Suryanarayan,2006:
Moolakkattu,2004).
However, the ceasefire agreement was not
solely a result of Norway’s years-long
constant diplomatic effort, but there were
other domestic-military stalemate and
international factors - post 9/11 atmosphere -
that contributed to the realization of the CFA.
(Samaranayeke 2006 : Suryanarayan 2006
:Saravanamuthu 2006 : Shanmugaratnam and
stoke, 2004: Gunatilake, 2006 : Uyangoda,
2005c). The spirit of the CFA is to serve as an
instrument to maintain the status quo balance
of capabilities in military and strategic terms
between the combatants. In other words, CFA
sought to freeze the military-balance between
the protagonists in order to de-escalate
violence which the protagonists perceived
necessary, although due to different reasons,
step towards negotiations (Uyangoda,2005a
p337: Athas,2006 p122).It is CFA on which
smooth progress of negotiation process stood
on. This is to say that smooth progress of
negotiation process necessitated the smooth
implementation of CFA with compliance by
and commitment of protagonists. It was
agreed, according to the preamble of the
ceasefire agreement, by both parties that
bringing an end to the hostilities is a means
of establishing a positive atmosphere in which
further steps towards a lasting solution can
be taken. Another role of CFA was to improve
the life of the people in preparation for a
settlement process (Uyangoda,2005a
p338).Also it had a deterrent function and
ensured that violations of the cease-fire have
a significant political cost, both at local and
at international level (Helegesen,2003).
Multiple interveners, combined
strategies and peace   process
It was an unprecedented effort in the history
of thirdparty involvement in Sri Lanka’s
ethnic conflict resolution that the involvement
of a group of countries (Norway, the
US,EU,Japan) with the proclaimed-aim of
bringing an end to decades-long civil war
through making individual and coordinated
efforts and functions. Norway, as the principal
intervener, had primarily engaged herself in
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political and non-coercive diplomatic
undertakings through its facilitatory and
mediatory functions (Moolakkattu, 2005).
The critical role that Norway played in
drafting, finalization and enforcement of
CFA through the mechanism called Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
underscored the onset of its active
diplomatic involvement in the peace process
which came into force shortly after the
signing of CFA between the GoSL and
LTTE in 2000 February. As an individual
(diplomatic) role, Norway’s functions was
primarily  associated with facilitating peace
negotiations and assisting the protagonists
in devising modalities to implement
agreements reached upon between the
protagonists during peace talks. In this
sense, six rounds of such talks were held
within one year (2000 March to 2003 April)
with varying degree of outcome. The most
imminent one of such outcomes was the
consensus between the protagonists to
jointly explore the possibilities for a federal
solution to the conflict (Silva, 2003:
Waldman, 2002).
With regard to the other interveners such as
the US, European Union and Japan, they
were all late comers into the process at the
request by and invitation of both Norway
and the protagonists, and played
supplementary role of ‘consolidation of the
peace process, in differing capacity to the
Norwegian diplomatic initiative.
Donor Co-Chairs and the peace
process
Co-Chairs of Sri Lanka’s peace process is
the economic component of the multilateral
intervention consisting of countries such as
the US, EU, Japan and Norway that used
development aid assistance as their
incentive to protagonists to move them
forward with peace process. In that sense,
they (Donor Co-Chairs) made a pledge of
$4.5billion for developmental activities in the
war-torn areas of Sri Lanka in 2003 after the
Tokyo donor conference (Venkataramanan,
2006). Nearly one quarter of the package was
pledged by Japan. However, the disbursement
of this pledged aid was conditioned to the
clear progress that the protagonists make in
pursuing the peace process. As for the
combatants, it was an incentive to drive them
to profess their commitment toward the peace
process by coming up with set of proposals
for interim administration for North and East
provinces to undertake developmental related
activities with LTTE participation. As
Japanese participant suggested that the
promise of major external assistance —
expected to be some $3 billion over three
years — was what had kept the disputing
parties at the negotiating table (McDonald,
2003).In retrospect, it might have been useful
to have had a co-chair mechanism from the
beginning of the peace process, with a
political mandate complementing aid
coordination.
The US, EU and escalation of
violence
As a late comer to the peace process, the US
joined the Co-Chairs at the request and
persuasion of both the SLG and Norway to
keep the LTTE on the peace process. The US
approach, given the most of the statements
relating to the peace process since early 2002
was not confined to expression of support, but
had extended to trenchant criticism of and
threat of use of force against LTTE. This fact
had become clear when Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage made the remark that
the US might ‘hunt down’ the LTTE if it failed
to renounce violence and terrorism
(Venkataramanan, 2006 p208).
Further, an evidence demonstrating the
tangible effect of the combined intervention
is when it influenced the decision change of
the LTTE over participation at the Geneva
An Analysis of the Effects of Norway-Led Multilateral Intervention on the Course and Duration of the Civil War in Sri Lanka
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talks vis-à-vis the review of effective
implementation of the CFA with the
GoSL.The LTTE was reluctant and wanted
to avoid its participation at the talks citing
tense situation on the ground allegedly
caused by the GoSL security forces,
although Erick Solheim, the Norway
mediator, made efforts at his best to
persuade them. However, the LTTE changed
its decision to participate the talks following
a statement by a US diplomat that carried a
message of threat to use of force against
them which cooled the tensions on the
ground. As reported by Economic and
Political Weekly (2006), the US diplomat
was saying that “If the LTTE chooses to
abandon peace, however, we want it to be
clear, they will face a stronger, more capable
and more determined Sri Lankan military.
We want the cost of a return to war to be
high “ (2006). As for the results of the talks,
both the protagonists agreed to comply with
CFA by ceasing their hostile activities. For
instance, the Sri Lankan government agreed
to end Tamil paramilitary violence in
Government controlled areas and disarm the
groups. The LTTE agreed to control
violence committed by Tamil civilian forces
(Jeyeraj, 2006).
Not the US did pause its role only with
making stunt statements but further she went
on to donate USCG Cutter Courageous
offshore patrol vessel to the Sri Lankan
Navy, in order to strengthen its (SL Navy)
capability to check and deter threats from
LTTE’s sea tiger fleet which frequent
exercise and presence at Northern sea of Sri
Lanka was great challenge to the GoSL and
SLMM and the smooth existence of CFA
was another example of the US to maintain
balance of forces between the protagonists,
and thus to ensure the continued compliance
of them to CFA. It marked the first
significant military hardware transfer to Sri
Lanka (Embassy of Sri Lanka in
Washington 2004).
Moreover, it (US) also tried to pursue other
countries to take stern action against LTTE.
As an official attached to the State Department
mentioned, “We are in touch with govern
ments around the world to bring to bear
whatever pressure we can on the Tamil Tigers
to abandon this (armed violence) course of
action and to look for ways that we can
support the government on coping with the
threat”(Tamil Guardian,2003 May 3 ).
On the other hand, European Union, one of
the Co-Chairs, through its coercive diplomatic
and economic approach toward the
protagonists, particularly to the LTTE, helped
to ensure the continued effect of the CFA
which in fact was in grave danger of collapse
when the LTTE assassinated Sri Lanka
Foreign Affairs Minister at his Colombo
residence. This was deemed as a blatant
violation and threat to the CFA.0 However,
as reported by the Tamil Week (May 18),the
prompt action taken by the EU against LTTE
both for the increasing violence(including the
assassination of SL foreign minister) and its
pull out from the Geneva talks with the GoSL
by imposing a travel ban on the LTTE to EU
member countries and later by formally
proscribing LTTE as a terrorist organization,
and thus asking member countries to freeze
all its(LTTE) properties, bank accounts,
holdings and companies, and to thwart its
illegal tax collection among Tamil diaspora
living in the European Union. As for the
LTTE, the support-both political and
financial-from the diaspora community is
critically important to pursue its struggle
(Saravanamuttu, 2006).
Success and failures of the peace
process
The six rounds of talks held between the SLG
and the LTTE during one year period of time
(from 2002 March to 2003 April) had yielded
in mixed outcome with successes and failures.
Of success, the protagonists were able to reach
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some monumental agreements vis-à-vis
some fundamental core-issues of the
conflict i.e. agreement to find solutions to
the issues including final solution to the
conflict within federal framework. Of these,
setting up an interim administration in the
northeast of Sri Lanka under LTTE control
was a major concession by the government
to Tiger demands which were a prerequisite
for further talks (Jayasinghe, 2003). Further,
the CFA had been in effect for well over
four years faced with ups and downs at
times. As many would share this is the
hallmark evidence of the overall effect of
the peace process facilitated by Norway
(Venkataramanan, 2006).
In short, as Uyangoda (2005a) pointed out,
there were two crucial and historic gains in
the 2002-2003 peace process. The
suspension of the war between the Sri
Lankan state and the LTTE is the first major
gain. The ceasefire agreement, despite its
many shortcomings, has demonstrated that
it is possible to de-link Sri Lanka’s ethnic
conflict from war and violence between the
state and Tamil political actors. Secondly,
the commitment made by the government
and the LTTE to explore a federal solution
provides the basis for the historic
compromise necessary to transform Sri
Lanka’s civil war into peace.
Among the failures, the most important was,
although they (protagonists) agreed to set
up a provisional interim authority for the
North and East provinces(ISGA) to
undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction
activities under the LTTE’s dominant
participation, they could not reach an
agreement over the structure, scope and
authority of such mechanism (Uyangoda,
2005c).Second, the GoSL’s inability to
relocate, as it was agreed upon in the CFA,
its armed forces stationed at sensitive but
critical so-called high security zones(HSZ)
in Jaffna peninsula. These two issues were
being claimed to be obstacle to resume talks,
according to LTTE.0However, there were
other problems emerging in the later stage of
the process.
Outcome of combined strategy
It is possible, based on the overall effects of
the peace process, to summarize the outcome
of collective intervention on the following.
As a matter of fact, the strategy had yielded
with both positive and negative consequences
in terms of the goal and objectives of the
interveners. As for the intervener, they
expected a speedy progress in the negotiation
while making sure of strengthenment of the
CFA, and thus engendering short term
solutions to the issues. As Uyangoda (2005c)
maintained, in their (interveners) agenda,
there was a heavy emphasis on short-term
success. In that sense, a landmark ceasefire
that has lasted for years has brought a degree
of normalcy to the island after two decades
of civil war. Regardless of the strains in the
truce and uncertainty about the future of the
peace process, the ceasefire brokered by the
Norwegian government had held and the talks
had progressed (Ediripullige,2002:
Samaranayake,2006).The maintenance of the
cease-fire agreement, particularly after the
peace talks entered a stalemate, was largely
due to the presence of international actors in
the peace process (Uyangoda, 2005c).
Moreover, CFA of February 2002
dramatically changed the security situation in
Sri Lanka.It was successful not only in
formally stopping the civil war for the longest
period since its inception but also in ending
most direct attacks by the LTTE or
government forces on each other, at least until
late 2005. Also CFA was successful in
bringing some normalization to the lives of
many people in the north and east. In this
sense, the ceasefire and the peace process had
opened up space for a political solution to the
conflict (Hoglund,2005 pp.162 -166;Crisis
Group 2006; Quoted in Silva, 2002).
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Source; Weerekoon B., (2006) p.33
SF=Security Forces
IPK=Indian Peace Keeping Force
Govt.
Security
Force  Numb.
LTTE
Number
Civilians
(killed in the
 cross fire)
Army
17, 686
 Navy
786
Air Force
432
Police
2,387
Aux Forces
151
Total
21,464
Cadres
17,763
Against  IPKF
592
Total
20,335
Total
 26,382
SF+LTTE+riots
26,382
2002             2003             2004             2005
15 57
Included
25
Chinese
fisher men)
   28    160
Source; includes SLMM; Weerekoon B., (2006)
In the run-up to the talks, the level of
violence had dropped markedly, presumably
demonstrating that both sides could be
influenced to by the combined strategy
which while persuading the protagonists
with non-coercive mediation pushed them
to do so with coercive measures such as
threat of use of force and aid cut. The US
coercive diplomatic approach towards to the
LTTE had helped to keep the peace process
honest. The US presence as a deterrent
against the LTTE prevented the latter from
abandoning the negotiating table. However,
the optimism that characterized the situation
on the ground in the first year of the peace
process had gradually been replaced by
growing frustration.
The following tables depict a comparative
overview of the situational difference before
and after of the Fifth peace process.
Table 1 total casualty (Killed in action and
Missing in action) in Armed Conflict with
LTTE (April 1983-feb2002)
Table 2 Casualties during the period of
Ceasefire -Security Forces, LTTE and
civilians (Killed by the both parties)
In respect to the consequences that seemingly
not promising and somewhat frustrating the
interveners altogether can be observed by
looking at the relationship between the
protagonists themselves and the interveners
as well. As the ground reality would
demonstrate, the CFA in deed had become
almost defunct particularly after 2005 with
an increase in the low-intensity hostilities
between the protagonists. As the Crisis Group
(2006) study claimed that CFA that led to the
longest period of peace since the 1980s had
already collapsed. The major failure of the
2002-2003 peace initiative as a process was
that the parties did not succeed in signing even
an interim political settlement to consolidate
the gains of the CFA and six rounds of talks.
They failed to sign an agreement for an
interim administrative structure in 2003-2004.
The ground conditions on which the peace
process was launched in 2002 had changed
considerably. The condition of strategic parity
had been greatly altered. The trust between
the government and the LTTE eroded
considerably (Uyangoda, 2005c).
Limits of Combined strategy
Combined intervention, as a strategy intended
to influence the course of the conflict by
changing the behavior of the protagonists, has
its own constraints at least in the Sri Lankan
context. This limit of the strategy is
discernible from the remarks and comments
An Analysis of the Effects of Norway-Led Multilateral Intervention on the Course and Duration of the Civil War in Sri Lanka
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of the interveners and other actors involved
in the process. For example, as Yashushi
Akashi, the Japanese special envoy for Sri
Lanka peace process, desperately observed
that “ownership of making peace is with
both parties” (Asian Tribune 2006).As
Paikkiasothy Saravanamuthu(The Morning
Leader, 2006) an observer of the peace
process, noted that Japanese Special Envoy
Yasushi Akashi’s remarks regarding Co-
Chairs’ engagement in soul-searching draws
attention to the possibilities and limitations
that are integral to the role of the interna
tional community in the conflict trans
formation process in Sri Lanka. The soul-
searching after all is also an admission of
limited effect and impotence. To the effect
of proving this fact, LTTE’s chief negotiator
once noted that actions and policies of the
LTTE are determined not by the choices of
the International community but by the
deteriorating ground situations, according
to the report by a Tamil daily Virekesari
(2006).
This fact became even more obvious,
according to the report by Economic and
Political Weekly (2006), when the LTTE
remained intransigent in spite of
international sanctions and pressure, and
enforced a “boycott” of the November 2005
presidential elections in the north and east.
In doing so, they effectively ensured the
defeat of Wickramasinghe, on whom the
international community had placed its
hopes for a resolution to the conflict.
Following this, the LTTE leader Vellupillai
Prabhakaran threatened to resume the war
in his much awaited annual heroes’ day
speech in late November 2005.Further, in a
situation where the EU ban was being
mooted as pressure aiming to bring the
LTTE to the negotiating table the LTTE
ideologue was constrained to point out that
the opposite may happen. Instead of
promoting peace it may promote war he
pointed out (Jeyeraj, 2006).
Analysis
The above account of aspects (course of action
and outcome) linked with Norway-led
multilateral intervention in the peace process
requires two levels of analysis in order to
examine the assumption in a more sound
manner. First, aspects and issues engulfed the
strategy itself. Second, factors which
potentially influenced the outcome of the
intervention. The aspects and issues engulfed
the combined strategy, although it largely fits
the formula (combinations, sequence and
framing) that empirical model demands-
diplomatic intervention preceded the other
two forms (economic and military) of
intervention,-becomes subject to close
examination over its objective and
administration on the ground. In terms of the
sequence under which Norway-led
multilateral intervention was exercised, it
followed the sequence, as the empirical model
demands, where diplomacy and mediation
(including facilitation) preceded in a
reasonable amount of time (approximately
four years commencing from 1998 to 2002).If
that so, as the model suggests, the duration of
the conflict should have reduced substantially
(95% of probability of duration decrease
(Regan and Aydin, 2004).
This means high possibility of ending the
conflict. However, based on the above
description, it was not utterly the case in Sri
Lankan context. In contrast, as the same
model suggests, economic and diplomatic
interventions have their greatest effect at the
time they were implemented, and that this
influence declines at a decelerating rate. To
put it other way round, diplomatic interven
tions increases the likelihood that a civil war
ends in the next month but as the period of
time from the point of the diplomatic effort
increases, the effect of the intervention
decreases. For economic interventions,
although they will initially increase the
expected duration of a conflict, the
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debilitating effect on the duration of a
conflict decreases over time. Whereas,
military form of intervention has no effect
on the duration of the conflict, according to
the model. Given this argument in the Sri
Lankan context, it is very possible to posit
that Norway facilitated peace process had
brought about significant positive changes
(some of them constitute as historical
compromise and turning points).
Nonetheless, most of the positive effects
turned to intractable and controversial issues
in the very next year (2003) when there was
an active economic and coercive (military)
interventions.
As such, it is highly possible to draw two
different but interrelated inferences. First,
that diplomatic intervention in itself was
effective but limited in terms of continued
leverage and influence on the combatants.
It was effective at manipulating information,
and that commanded compliance and
commitment of the protagonists toward
ceasefire agreement to some degree. Also,
it was limited in exerting leverage and
influence on the protagonists when the
sensitive core-issues became forefront at
negotiating table. This was particularly the
case when protagonists were relatively par
in military and strategic capabilities. Second
inference that can be drawn is that lack of
effective manipulation of the balance of
capabilities between the combatants that
were already in a state of stalemate seeking
external assistance to way out of it. This
specifically refers to the GoSL’s position at
the onset of the intervention and LTTE at
the later stage, particularly after its split in
early 2004.Therefore, shifting the balance
of power in favor of weaker side would lead
to its positional strength, and thus upsetting
the negotiation process.
Third inference can be conceived to be
exercise of only one of those two strategies.
As the model posits, the most effective
interventions will manipulate costs/benefits
from a peace agreement, and the level of
misinformation or strategic uncertainty about
adversaries’ capability and resolve. It is
discernible in the Sri Lankan context that the
co-optation of the US, EU, Japan into Norway
mediated negotiation process and the resultant
international guarantee for support and
punishment under the ‘international safety
net’ which affects the combatants’ view of the
international actors involved in the process.
For instance, GoSL’s view of it was very
favorable whereas LTTE viewed it with great
suspicion. As Balasinghem, LTTE chief
negotiator, lashed out, it is “excessive
internationalization “of the peace process,
claiming foreign powers were trying to force
solution on the Tamils (Noyahr 2006 p366)
In contrast, Prime Minister fo Sri Lanka
Wickramasinghe said, “ if they(the
tigers)break it(peace negotiation) they are
going to be in trouble. I will not go alone
down this road. I will go with the international
community, so that the promises they make
are kept (2006). It was suggested by many
that the travel ban imposed by EU on LTTE
was a result of this ‘international safety net’.
To make this point more precise, for LTTE,
Norway’s mediatory role was much
acceptable and they were happy of
that(Pirabaharan,leader of LTTE,hailed Oslo
for “its impartiality and objective neutrality”-
(Baruah,2003) but they were often suspicious
about the involvement of the US in the
process(Involving US in the negotiation
process was partly the reason for the LTTE
to pull out of the talks, especially for using
them for military as well as political purposes
of Sri Lanka(Balasinghem,2004 p 434).
In that sense, Norway’s mediation was
directed primarily toward manipulating the
information of capabilities of combatants
which in turn resulted in the conclusion of
the historic truce agreement between the
protagonists. On the other hand, economic
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and military strategies while served as a
back up for Norway’s mediation efforts
whose leverage and influence on the
combatants, at a certain point, were diluted
partly by the intransigent position of the
LTTE on the interim self-governing
authority and partly by the US’ coercive and
belligerent strategy toward LTTE helped
salvage and uphold the CFA which
continued existence with series of ups and
downs on the ground underscores the
undiminished effect of the combined
intervention strategy.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis on the potential
effect of particular-with the sequence under
which diplomatic component preceded over
two other (economic and military)
components- combined intervention
strategy tends to suggest that on several
respects and aspects (vitally in two ways)
the strategy was relatively effective at least
in prolonging the ceasefire agreement
(CFA) between the combatants for more
than three years with many ups and downs
in its actual implementation.However,the
effect of the strategy is particularly
discernible in their (combatants) functional
or military and positional or strategic
capabilities.0That the onset success of CFA
in restraining the protagonists’ capability of
direct engagement, and thus maintained
least level of violence paved way for the
prevalence of negative peace throughout the
country, at least for over one year,
demonstrates the level of influence that the
combined intervention strategy commanded
on the duration of the conflict. On the other
hand, concessions, compromise and
agreements reached between the
protagonists over fundamental issues of the
conflict underscore the scale of effect that
combined strategy inflicted on the course
of the conflict.
Nevertheless, given the degree of effect and
influence that combined strategy inflicted in
Sri Lankan context in contrast to the degree
that the empirical model (developed by Regan
and Aydin) showed, it is obvious that there
existed demonstrably a modest difference of
effect between these two studies in terms of
two respects; the degree of effect of the
overall strategy; potential significant effect
that military component of the strategy
brought about. One possible reason for the
difference of magnitude probably, as the
model suggests, may be the difference of
administration of the combined strategy on
the ground. That, for the Sri Lankan context,
the combined strategy was exercised both on
individual and concerted capacities to exert
pressure and persuasion on the protagonists.
This difference of administration can possibly
be attributed to be the factor that makes level
difference of outcome between the findings
of these two studies.
Lastly, it is debatable, at least based on the
Sri Lankan context, that whether military
component of the combined strategy plausibly
affects the outcome of other two components.
As the analysis shows it has remarkable
influence, be it positive or negative, at least
on the behavior of the combatants if not on
the overall duration of the conflict. It can
,therefore, be alternatively argued that overall
outcome of combined strategy is not
determined by the particular sequence of
strategies alone but by the manner in which
it is being administered on the ground, and
the other subjective factors such as resolve
and identity of the protagonists too.
However, it is being left for further future
investigation and analysis that to what extent
the multilateral intervention strategy can or
should engender maximum positive outcome
in which negative peace was replaced by
positive peace. In the case of Sri Lanka,
although the combined intervention was
exercised for well over four years, it could
An Analysis of the Effects of Norway-Led Multilateral Intervention on the Course and Duration of the Civil War in Sri Lanka
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only yield negative peace with promising
prospects for positive peace at least in the
first two years of its commencement.
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